Almost every published comparison sets hedged equity against unhedged equity. In that table the hedge always wins on drawdown and always loses on return, so both sides of the argument walk away with the answer they arrived with. It is not a test.
The test is the de-risked arm: no options at all, just a smaller share of equities with the rest in T-bills, swept across every weight from 100% down to 40%. That curve is what a plain two-fund portfolio delivers for nothing. A hedge has to land above it to have bought anything.
All four withdraw the same real dollars on the same day from identical market paths.
Out-of-the-money puts cost more than at-the-money ones, because everyone wants crash protection and nobody wants to sell it. WHL-001 measured that skew properly from the Cboe SPY option chain and got −0.955 — but it fitted that on 30-delta puts one month out.
This study buys 15-delta puts three months out: further from the money and further out in time, in both cases outside the region where the number was measured. Re-measuring on the same chain at the strikes and tenors actually traded:
| Window | Actual IV | Straight-line model | Error |
|---|---|---|---|
| 20–40 DTE, 5–20 delta — the fit region | 19.13% | 19.16% | +0.03 pts |
| 60–120 DTE, 5–20 delta — what this study buys | 22.92% | 26.78% | +3.86 pts |
The fitted wing slope falls from −0.968 at one month to −0.646 at three. So the old number would have overcharged this hedge by nearly four volatility points — biasing the study toward the conclusion it already expected. The default here is the tenor-aware measured curve. Set the skew control to −0.955 to see what the unchecked extrapolation does to the answer.
Maximum drawdown of a withdrawing balance conflates two completely different things: a market crash, and slowly running out of money. A portfolio bleeding 3% a year in premium posts an enormous balance drawdown with no crash anywhere in it.
The first version of this study used balance drawdown and duly reported the hedged arm as riskier than the unhedged one — which a long put cannot be. So risk here is measured on NAV: the strategy's unit value, with the withdrawal treated as an external cashflow and the option premium charged to the strategy where it belongs. The balance drawdown is still reported beside it, because for a retiree it is a real question — it is just not a measure of market risk.
A 15-delta three-month put needs the index to fall about 9.5% inside a single quarter before it pays for itself. What that means for real declines:
| A 45% fall… | Premium paid | Payoff | Share of the fall covered |
|---|---|---|---|
| in one quarter | 0.82% | 36.30% | 80.7% |
| over three quarters | 2.45% | 27.89% | 62.2% |
| over six quarters | 4.90% | 4.78% | 10.6% |
| over ten quarters | 8.17% | 0.00% | 0.0% |
The strike resets at every roll, so a decline arriving in instalments is never seen. This single fact dominates everything else on the page — move the roll frequency and watch it.
The engine on this page is a port of the reference implementation, and the two agree. Both are driven by the same measured pricing map.
RET-PUT-001/engine/verify.mjs — the gates aboveRET-PUT-001/engine/run.mjs — the studyRET-PUT-001/notes/check-far-wing.py — the wing re-measurementRET-PUT-001/engine/payoff-check.mjs and crash-shape.mjs — the
mechanism table and the bootstrap checkModel-based research, not investment advice and not a recommendation about any portfolio or strategy. Option prices are generated from realised volatility plus stated implied-volatility and skew assumptions, not from live quotes.