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DIV-001 · Read me first
Dividend investing after tax, and the question nobody asks
The question. Two investors hold the same market in the same taxable account. One owns a
dividend-focused fund and lives on the distributions; the other owns the total market and sells
shares for the same cash. After tax, who has more — and how much better would the dividend
fund have to perform, before tax, just to break even?
The argument in the wild is not really about tax. It is about control. One side says income
arrives without a decision and does not require selling into a falling market. The other says a
dividend is a forced partial liquidation you did not authorise and cannot defer, and that the tax
code charges you for the privilege.
Both sides are arguing past a number that can be computed. This page computes it.
What the page does not claim
It does not assume dividend stocks earn more than the market, or less. Nobody can measure
that reliably, and a study that quietly picks a side has answered its own question. Instead the
pre-tax premium is the horizontal axis of the first chart, swept from −100 to +300
basis points a year. The deliverable is the crossing: the premium at which the two arms draw.
Compare it against whatever premium you believe a dividend tilt actually earns. Supplying that
belief is your job, not the page's.
The null, and why it is enforced rather than assumed
A dividend is a transfer from the share price into your pocket. The engine builds that in: the
month's bootstrapped factor is total return, the distribution is paid monthly, and the price
drops by exactly the distribution. With full reinvestment,
shares′ × price′ = shares × (price×G − D) + shares×D = shares × price × G
so any yield returns exactly the same total return. Raising the dividend yield moves money from
the price into your hands and changes nothing else — until tax touches it.
Check it yourself. Set Account type to Tax-free (Roth). A 3.0% fund and a 1.2%
fund must then end in exactly the same place on every path. That is dividend irrelevance,
it is the page's own regression test, and if those two columns ever differ there, ignore every
other number on the page.
Why the tax is not symmetric — the whole study in four lines
- The dividend investor receives the distribution and is taxed on 100% of it, every year,
whether or not they wanted the cash.
- The market investor sells shares and is taxed only on the gain fraction of the sale. The
basis comes back untaxed.
- The market investor's unrealised appreciation compounds untaxed until sold — and if the
money is left as an estate, never taxed at all.
- The dividend investor cannot defer, harvest, or time any of it.
The two numbers most readers need first
A 65+ couple filing jointly with no other income owes exactly zero federal tax on qualified
dividends up to $146,400 — a $47,500 standard deduction plus $98,900 of taxable income
inside the 0% preferential bracket. For that household the entire dividend-versus-index tax
argument is worth nothing.
Add $60,000 of Social Security and that free band collapses to $62,824, because benefits
are dragged into taxable income behind the dividends. That second number is the one nobody
expects, and it is why the Social Security control on the lab page is not decoration.
What was measured, and where it came from
Yields. Trailing-twelve-month distributions over month-end price, from the Yahoo chart
API, computed in DIV-001/notes/calibrate-dividends.mjs:
| Fund | Span | Mean | Latest |
| SPY | 1994–2026 | 1.72% | 0.98% |
| VYM | 2007–2026 | 3.01% | 2.21% |
| DVY | 2004–2026 | 3.52% | 3.21% |
| SCHD | 2012–2026 | 3.05% | 3.00% |
| VIG | 2007–2026 | 1.94% | 1.47% |
Dividend cuts, and the folklore they contradict. In 2007–09, trailing distributions
per share fell by:
| Fund | Drawdown | Distribution cut | Lag behind the trough |
| SPY | −50.8% | −25.3% | 13 months |
| VYM | −49.9% | −30.8% | 16 months |
| DVY | −57.4% | −35.1% | 13 months |
| VIG | −41.1% | −11.6% | 13 months |
The dividend funds cut harder than the market did, by 1.2 to 1.4 times, and the cut
landed more than a year after the price trough — well into the recovery, by which time a
retiree has already been selling.
And no model of the cut actually works. The 2000–02 bear was a −44.7% drawdown
that cut SPY's distributions by 3.3%; 2007–09 was −50.8% and cut them by 25.3%.
Two crashes of nearly the same depth, an order of magnitude apart in what they did to the income,
because the driver is an earnings and credit collapse rather than a de-rating. So the cut control
is a sweep, not a fitted constant. 0 is the dividend investor's own assumption; 0.5–0.62
is the 2008 experience; 0.767 is the pooled fit. SCHD, today's default dividend ETF, has never
lived through a financial-sector dividend collapse at all.
The tax model
2026 federal, married filing jointly, both spouses 65+, standard deduction. The core is
RET-CC-002's tax.js, unchanged: seven ordinary brackets, three preferential
brackets stacked on ordinary taxable income, the OBBB senior deduction with its 6% phase-out, the
3.8% NIIT at its unindexed $250,000 threshold, and capital-loss netting by character with the
$3,000 ordinary offset and carryforward. Constants sourced to IRS Rev. Proc. 2025-32.
Two things are added for this study, in tax-ext.js, additively —
tax.js is not edited, and with Social Security and Medicare both off the extension
returns bit-for-bit what the original returns:
1. Medicare IRMAA. A cliff, not a phase-in: one dollar of MAGI over a threshold costs the
whole step, for each spouse, for a full year, on a two-year lookback. From the CMS fact sheet of
2025-11-14, for a couple both enrolled:
| MAGI crossed (joint) | Annual surcharge | Step |
| $218,000 | $2,296.80 | +$2,296.80 |
| $274,000 | $5,769.60 | +$3,472.80 |
| $342,000 | $9,240.00 | +$3,470.40 |
| $410,000 | $12,710.40 | +$3,470.40 |
| $750,000 | $13,872.00 | +$1,161.60 |
2. Taxation of Social Security via provisional income, under IRC §86. Dividends count
toward provisional income, so forced distributions drag part of the benefit into ordinary income
— a second tax on the same dollar. The $32,000 and $44,000 thresholds have not been indexed
since 1983 and 1993 and are modelled that way on purpose.
Accounting decisions that matter
- The portfolio is charged only the tax it caused — the household's bill including
this year's distributions and realised gains, minus what it would have owed on its other income
alone. Other income positions the household on the bracket ladder; it is not a bill the
investments settle.
- Tax is paid the following April, by selling shares. That is what actually happens, and
it removes a circularity that would otherwise need a fixed point.
- Cost basis is tracked lot by lot, with FIFO the default because it is the least
favourable to the market investor. In retirement at a 4% spend it usually changes nothing: a
1.2–3.0% yield never exceeds the withdrawal, no shares are ever bought, and there is only
ever one lot.
- Distributions are paid monthly, not quarterly. Quarterly payment strands cash between
the payment and the spending; the higher-yielding arm carries more of it and loses for a reason
that has nothing to do with tax.
- Inflation is a stochastic AR(1) fitted 1948–2025, and indexed thresholds inflate
along the same path, so bracket creep is not smuggled in as a result.
Where the dividend fund is given the benefit of the doubt
This study expected to conclude against dividend investing, so every unresolved choice was made
in the dividend fund's favour. Its yield default sits at the low end of the measured range and the
market fund's at the high end; its distributions are fully qualified; the market investor is
charged the least favourable lot method; excess income is reinvested rather than assumed spent.
And one of those gifts is larger than it looks. The volatility control defaults to
0.90 — a 10% reduction in volatility handed to the dividend fund at no cost in expected
return, which is a free improvement in risk-adjusted return that no asset pricing model would
grant. It is why the survival and drawdown rows favour the dividend fund. That is an
assumption, not a finding. Set the control to 1.00 to see the pure tax answer.
Verification
- Dividend irrelevance. Roth, equal fees, volatility 1.00: a 1.2% fund and a 3.0% fund end
identical to 6.5×10−14 relative across every path.
- The closed form. At zero volatility and a flat 18.8% preferential rate, the algebra
predicts a 33.8 bps gap and the engine produces 35.3 — erring high, because the tax is itself
paid by selling shares and that sale realises gain too.
- The 0% bracket. A household inside the 0% preferential band shows a difference of
exactly zero from a taxable account.
- Fees. 30 bps of fee difference compounds to exactly 30 bps a year over 30 years in
accumulation.
- The extension is a no-op. With Social Security and Medicare off,
householdBill() returns exactly ORLTax.bill() across 48 input
combinations, so RET-CC-002's published figures cannot have moved.
Limitations, stated plainly
- No claim that dividend stocks earn more or less. That premium is the horizontal axis.
- Sector concentration is captured only through the volatility control, which is a thin
proxy for a bet on a handful of industries.
- Return of capital is not modelled. Most high-yield option-income funds distribute it,
and it is a basis reduction rather than income. That deserves its own study.
- Foreign withholding and ADR fees are ignored.
- State tax is a flat rate on all realised investment income. Real state treatment of
preferential income varies.
- ACA premium subsidy cliffs are not modelled. For an early retiree under 65 they are
larger than IRMAA.
- The step-up in basis is current law, not a law of nature. If the terminal treatment is
what decides your answer — and it often is — then your answer depends on a rule
Congress can change.
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